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PRACMATISlvi has long been thought of as providing aid and comfort for 
the philosophic attitude which would require of any cognitively meaning- 
ful statement that it be capable of empirical verification. Although repre- 
sented by William James as an agency of reconciliation between the tough 
and the tender minded, it has often been found in the vanguard of the 
logical positivists, logical empiricists, scientific empiricists, and other parti- 
sans of the meter reading. Nor is that fountainhead of things pragmatic 
and pragmaticistic, Charles Sanders Peirce, excluded from the scope of this 
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association. In fact it has become rather common in certain circles to 
regard Peirce's Pragmatic Principle as little more than an early, and rather 
crude, version of the Verifiability Theory of Meaning. For example, ]ustus 
Buchler states Peirce's pragmatism "concisely" as follows: "only those 
statements are genuinely synthetic which have sensible or experimental, 
i.e., confirmable, consequences. ''1 And, again, "the meaning of a synthetic 
sentence is its pragmatic interpretant," and a pragmatic interpretant is "a 
formula for the entire class of confirmable consequences of a statement. ''2 
There is no doubt that an interpretation of this sort finds considerable 
support in Peirce's writings. In the first place, many of Peirce's formula- 
tions of what came to be called the Principle of Pragmatism are explicitly 
framed as interpretations of the meaning of a verbal expression, or of the 
import of a concept, in terms of the empirically discriminable consequences 
of certain actions. ~ Consider the following statements of the principle: 
"In order to ascertain the meaning of an intellectual conception one 
should consider what practical consequences might conceivably result by 
necessity from the truth of that conception; and the sum of these conse- 
quences will constitute the entire meaning of the conception." (5.9) 4 
"If one can define accurately all the conceivable experimental phe- 
nomena which the affirmation or denial of a concept could imply, one will 
have therein a complete definition of the concept, and there is absoIutely 
nothing more in it." (5.412) 
"The total meaning of the predication of an intellectual concept is con- 
tained in an affirmation that, under all conceivable circumstances of a 
given kind . . . the subject of the predication would behave in a certain 
way--that is, it would be true under given experiential circumstances . . ." 
(5.467) ~ 
It is quite natural and proper that formulations of this sort should be 
translated into the form of a verifiability theory. For an assertion that a 
given line of action will have certain specifiable sensory results is the model 
of an empirically testable assertionfl and so to say that the meaning of any 
statement consists of such assertions is to say that it consists of verifiable 
consequences. 
A second support for this interpretation is to be found in some of the 
statements Peirce makes about the origin or basis of pragmatism. For 
example, he speaks in one place of pragmatism as having its origin in a 
laboratory mode of thinking or experimentalist temper of mind, which 
conditions a man so that "whatever assertion you may make to him, he 
will either understand as meaning that if a given prescription for an 
experiment ever can be and ever is carried out in act, an experience of a 
given description will result, or else he will see no sense at all in what you 
say." (5.411; cf. also 5.465) Finally some of the applications he makes of 
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the principle have the true positivistic ring, for example, his contention 
that "it is foolish for Catholics and Protestants to fancy themselves in dis- 
agreement about the elements of the sacrament, if they agree in regard to 
all their sensible effects, here and hereafter" (5.401), and his contention 
that  "if we know what the effects of force are, we are acquainted with 
every fact which is implied in saying that a force exists, and there is noth- 
ing more to know" (5.404). 
This verifiability interpretation would thus seem unassailable, were it 
not that some o f  the formulations of the Principle of Pragmatism are 
couched rather differently, and in a way which makes it more intelligible 
that the principle should be called "pragmatic." They are built around the 
notion of practical bearing or relevance to action. They assert, to put it 
succinctly, that the meaning of a concept or cognitive expression is to be 
found by considering the practically relevant features of its object--i.e., the 
features which might be taken account of in acting with respect to the 
object. The initial statement of the principle in the article of 1878, "How 
to Make Our Ideas Clear," is of this sort: ° "Consider what effects, that 
might conceivably have practical bearing, we conceive the object of our 
conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of 
our conception of the object." (5.402) 
Other examples of this mode of formulation are the following: 
"The entire intellectual purport of any symbol consists in the total of 
all general modes of rational conduct which, conditionally upon all the 
possible different circumstances and desires, would ensue upon the ac- 
ceptance of the symbol." (5.438) 
"A conception can have no logical effect or import differing from that 
of a second conception except so far as, taken in connection with other 
conceptions and intentions, it might conceivably modify our practical con- 
duct differently from that second conception." (5.196) 
"Pragmatism is the doctrine that every conception is a conception of 
conceivable practical effects . . ." (5.196) 
We  shall call this the practicatist ~ principle, and the version cited earlier 
the experimentalist principle. The  terms 'pragmatism' and 'pragmatic prin- 
ciple' will be employed in a more general sense, so that the two principles 
just mentioned will be considered as alternative formulations of the Prag- 
matic Principle (although, as we are going on to argue, not alternatives on 
the same level). 
We can further point up the difference between these two formulations 
by examining the schema which each would use in explicating the mean- 
ing of a statement. The  experimentalist finds the key to the meaning of a 
statement in the sensory results which it implicitly predicts. Hence he 
would interpret a statement of the form 'x is P' by providing a series of 
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interpretants 8 of the form (A) 'If you do m to x, then you will experi- 
ence n.' The practicalist, on the other hand, in concentrating directly on 
relevance to deliberate conduct, finds the meaning of a statement by con- 
sidering the ways it directs us to act toward an object when we desire 
certain results. Hence his interpretation of 'x is P' will be couched in state- 
ments of the form (B) 'If you want r, then you ought to do s to x." For 
example, the experimentalist would translate 'This is a bell' into a series 
of statements such as: 'If you strike this, you will experience a ringing 
sound.' Whereas the practicalist would employ in his translation state- 
ments like 'If you want to hear a ringing sound, you ought to strike this.' 
It is evident that statements of the first sort can always be transformed 
into those of the second sort, by simply (1) taking the experienced object 
as an object of desire and (2) taking the action which is the condition of 
the experience as the action to which one is obligated on the condition of 
having the desire. In terms of the above schemas, simply substitute 'n' for 
'r' and 'm' for 's.' But, as we shall argue in the sequel, the converse relation 
does not hold. Not  all practicalist interpretants can be transformed into 
experimentalist ones. 
W e  can also distinguish the two formulations in terms of the way in 
which each specifies the nonverbal states which are involved in belief. For 
the experimentalist it is expectations which play this role; for the practi- 
calist it is rather habits of conduct. On the experimentalist principle, to 
believe that this is a bell is to expect that certain sensory results will follow 
certain actions; on the practicalist principle it is to be disposed to act in 
certain ways on condition of having certain motives. Again it seems evident 
that whenever there is a sensory expectation, there is also a corresponding 
disposition to perform the action which is expected to produce the sensory 
result provided that result be desired. But, as we shall be contending, the 
reverse is not true; there are dispositions to action to which no sensory 
expectations correspond. 
The existence of the practicalist principle raises serious questions as to 
the adequacy of the positivistic interpretation. In order to answer these 
questions we must investigate the relative positions of the two formulations 
in the Peircean philosophy and the logical connections between them. It 
will be our  contention that: 
1. The practicalist principle occupies a more fundamental place in 
Peirce's thought. 
2. The experimentalist principle is arrived at only by conjoining the 
practicalist principle with a theory of human motivation which is 
open to doubt, to say the least, and hence the  positivistic tendency 
in Peirce is not, as is generally supposed, a necessary consequence of 
his initial pragmatic orientation. 
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3. If a more liberal theory of motivation is substituted we get a prag- 
matic theory of meaning which presents a complexion quite different 
from that of any verifiability theory. 
First as to the question of the relative priority. Buehler is typical of 
positivistically inclined interpreters in taking the experimentalist formula- 
tion to be the canonical statement and attempting to explain away the 
other as a later development, occasioned by extraneous influences from 
other pragmatists, 9 But there are at least two considerations which render 
this reading untenable. First, in Peirce's most typical method of justifying 
pragmatism it is the practicalist formulation which emerges first in the 
argument, and which then serves as ground for the assertion of the ex- 
perimentalist thesis. For example, in introducing the principle for the first 
time in "How to Make Our Ideas Clear," Peirce argues roughly as follows: 
The sole function of thought is the production of belief, which in turn 
essentially consists of a habit of action. Since a conception is essentially 
an  element of thought it can refer to nothing unrelated to thought's func- 
tion. Therefore the conception of any object is the conception of its "effects 
that might conceivably have practical bearings" (5.402), i.e., a conception 
of the object insofar as habitual modes of conduct might be directed on it. 
The experimentalist formulation is then derived from this by a process of 
reasoning the nature of which will be examined below. 
Essentially the same line of argument is found at the other end of 
Peirce's philosophical career in a fragment of 1908, included in Volume V 
of the Collected Papers (5.546-548). There Peirce maintains that (1) an 
assertion consists in taking responsibility for some future line of conduct-- 
i.e., disposing oneself to act in a certain way vis-h-vis future occurrences; 
(2) judgment is a kind of assertion; (3) no concept can exist apart from 
judgment; (4) hence a concept has its intellectual content through a bear- 
ing on conduct. And even in the last of his Lectures on Pragmatism (1903), 
where the pragmatic principle, conceived as the principle of abductive in- 
ference, is stated most unequivocally as a verifiability principle, Peirce 
makes its adequacy as a criterion of abductive inference to depend on the 
supposition that nothing but "possibly practical considerations"--i.e., con- 
siderations of what is relevant to purposive acfionwhave "any logical effect 
or import whatever." (5.196) 
The second consideration which makes the claim of priority for the 
experimentalist formulation untenable is this. When  Peirce came late in 
life to restate pragmatism in terms of his general theory of signs he does 
so by raising the question What  is the ultimate logical interpretant of a 
sign? (5.476) In other words, what is there in the interpreter of a sign 
which constitutes his understanding of the sign? The answer to this ques- 
tion that would reflect the  experimentalist formulation--viz., that the ulti- 
70 PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES 
mate logical interpretant is an expectation of sensory results--is rejected 
in favor of one which reflects the practicalist formulationmviz., that the 
ultimate logical interpretant is a habit or a habit change. 
If the practicalist formulation is the more basic in the order of Peirce's 
thought and the experimentalist formulation derived from it, how does 
this derivation take place? That it represents no mere analysis or restate- 
ment, but requires an additional premise, appears plainly in the following 
passage from "How to Make Our Ideas Clear." Having argued that the 
sole function of thought is to produce habits of action, Peirce goes on to 
say "What  the habit is depends on when and how it causes us to act. As 
for the when, every stimulus to action is derived from perception; as for 
the how, every purpose of action is to produce some sensible result . . . .  " 
(SAO0) And continuing the discussion, in speaking of the concept of 
wine: "The occasion of such action would be some sensible perception, 
the motive of it to produce some sensible result. Thus our action has ex- 
clusive reference to what affects the senses, our habit has the same bearing 
as our action, our belief the same as our habit, our conception the same as 
our belief; and we can consequently mean nothing by wine but what has 
certain effects, direct or indirect, upon our senses." (5.401) 
It is apparent from these passages how the transition takes place. The 
basis of the whole position, let us recall, is the conviction that the meaning 
of a cognitive sign is to be explicated in terms of the practically relevant 
aspects of its object. But what aspects of an object are practically relevant? 
Obviously those which our aims in dealing with the obiect would lead us 
to take account of. The discrimination of practically relevant aspects thus 
depends on an assessment of the aims of human action. It is at this point 
that Peirce introduces the crucial assumption that every deliberate action 
aims at producing some sensory experience or experiences. Grant this 
theory of motivation and it follows that only those characteristics of an 
object which will influence the sensations resulting from actions directed 
to that object can have any practical relevance, and hence that our con- 
ception of an object will be concerned exclusively with such characteristics 
as will be manifested in sensory experience. If we can cognitively refer to 
an object only with respect to what might appropriately be considered in 
action, and if all actions are directed to the production of sensations of 
one kind or another, it is evident that any cognitive expression has to do 
solely with the sensory potential of its object, and that our thought of any 
object will consist in supposing that "certain lines of conduct will entail 
certain kinds of inevitable experiences." (5.9) 
That this line of argument is not confined to the 1878 period is shown 
by the reasoning preceding another expression of the experimentalist 
formulation, contained in a paper written 27 years later, which sums up 
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the whole matter succinctly: "A conception, that is, the rational purport 
of a word or other expression, lies exclusively in its conceivable bearing 
upon the conduct  of life; so that, since obviously nothing that might not  
result from experiment can have any direct bearing upon conduct, if one 
can define accurately all the experimental phenomena which the affirma- 
tion or denial of a concept could imply, one will have therein a complete 
definition of the concept, and there is absolutely nothing more in it." 
(5.412. First underlining mine. Cf. also 5.427.) I t  is also worthy of note 
that in the argument of the contemporary logical empiricist who bases the 
verifiability theory of meaning most squarely on pragmatic considerations, 
the late Hans Reichenbach, an analogous crucial assumption seems to be 
involved) ° 
Thus the experimentalist principle which seems so characteristic of 
Peirce only follows from its practicalist basis provided we assume all action 
to be motivated by aims at certain sorts o f  sensory states. A defense of 
Peirce on this point would require a more cogent support for this theory 
of motivation than it has yet received. 
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NOTES 
1 Justus Buchler, Charles Pe/rce's Empiricism (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 
& Co., Ltd., 1939), p. 119. 
Ibid. 
8 Most of Peirce's formulations of the principle are concerned with the content or 
'meaning' of concepts. See, for example, 5.9, 5.196, 5.402, 5.412. (All references to the 
writings of Peirce are to Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, edited by Charles 
Hartshome and Paul Weiss (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 193t-1935), 
and are given in the standard way by specifying the volume and paragraph numbers.) 
Less often the principle is stated in terms of the meaning of verbal expressions, especially 
statements. See, for example, 5.18, 5.438, 5.467. These two modes of statement are not 
radically different for Peirce, since for him all thought is symbolic (5.421), and a con- 
cept functions as the meaning (in Peircean terms, the "interpretant") of a verbal ex- 
pression. (5.412) Hence, for any statement about the "import" or "meaning" of a 
concept there is an equivalent statement about the meaning of a verbal expression. 
' "Now this sort of consideration, namely, that certain lines of conduct will entail 
certain kinds of inevitable experiences is what is called a 'practical consideration'." (5.9) 
Cf. also 5.197, where Peirce speaks of the following as being "approximately the 
doctrine of pragmatism": "any hypothesis, therefore, may be admissible, in the absence 
of any special reasons to the contrary, provided it be capable of experimental verification, 
and only insofar as it is capable of such verification." 
It is analogous to what C. I. Lewis calls a terminating iudgment. 
7 It is true that Peirce explicitly rejected this term (5.412), but I am not using it 
with any of the Kantian connotations which were in Peirce's mind and which motivated 
his rejection. 
8 Following Peirce, we shall use the term 'interpretant' to refer to any sign which 
has the function of interpreting, explicating, or developing the meaning of another sign. 
9 Buchler, op. cir., pp. 154-55. 
1°See Experience and Prediction (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938), 
Chap. I, esp. pp. 64--68. 
